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The Prime Minister Speaks
 Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi began 2004 with a formal visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. 
During his campaign for the nation’s highest office three years before, he had pledged to visit 
the shrine at least once a year and he would faithfully honor this pledge during his more than 
five years in office.  But throughout Koizumi’s long tenure, this would be the only year that he 
arranged his visit for the New Year holiday, a time when Shinto shrines all over the country are 
crowded with people paying respect to the gods who, according to tradition, created the Japa-
nese islands.  In other years, the Prime Minister selected less conspicuous times.
 Because the Yasukuni shrine venerates the spirits of the war dead, including wartime 
prime minister General Hideki Tojo and others executed after the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, it 
is widely seen as a symbol of Japanese militarism.  Every visit by a Japanese prime minister 
provokes a storm of criticism from Beijing, Seoul, and Pyongyang – and sometimes even a 
mild rebuke from Washington.  Japan’s business and political leaders, some from the Prime 
Minister’s own party, recommended against these visits, but Koizumi brushed aside their cau-
tions.
 On January 1, 2004, he went in style.  According to a wire service report, he was 
“[D]ressed formally in hakama pleated skirt and traditional kimono bearing his family crest,” 
and he “walked solemnly into the shrine, which was surrounded by hundreds of well-wishers 
to mark the New Year’s Day.  He bowed deeply at the main chamber before being escorted 
inside by a Shinto priest and spent a few minutes paying his respects out of sight from the 
media.”1
 The visit would have a very special meaning that year.  On December 9, the Cabinet had 
formally approved a plan for the dispatch of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to Iraq.  The deploy-
ment would mark a major milestone in Japan’s postwar history as the first deployment of Japa-
nese military forces to an active war zone since 1945.  The Prime Minister delivered a formal 
statement explaining the decision at a nationally televised press conference that followed the 
Cabinet meeting.
 Koizumi assured the Japanese people that the SDF would not engage in combat; the Iraq 
contingent would only be involved in “humanitarian and reconstruction assistance.”  He did 
 1 “Koizumi pays surprise visit to Yasukuni shrine,” AFP Tokyo, Jan. 2, 2004, available at http://www.tai-
peitimes.com/News/world/archives/2004/01/02/2003086040.
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not describe the intense pressure applied by the Bush administration to put Japanese “boots on 
the ground” in Iraq, but left no doubt that his action was calculated to please Washington.
　　As I have long stated, in order to insure the peace and security of Japan and 
achieve greater prosperity, we must continue to enhance the Japan-US alliance, while 
simultaneously cooperating with the international community....I believe now is the 
time indeed when we are to be tested, not only in our words, but in our deeds, as we 
act to maintain both the US-Japan alliance and international coordination.  Japan 
cannot alone secure its own peace and security.  It was for this reason we concluded 
the Japan-US Security Treaty and why we must accord the Japan-US alliance the im-
portance it deserves.2
 The first step in the deployment of those forces had been taken on December 26 with the 
departure of an Air Self-Defense Forces advance team of 48 members for Kuwait to prepare 
an ASDF operations base.  They had boarded a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft at the ASDF 
base at Komaki, just outside Nagoya, for the long flight.  The Prime Minister dutifully traveled 
to the Komaki Base before their departure to convey his gratitude for the service of the small 
contingent and his wishes for their safe return.3  
 On January 16, the news media reported the landing of the Ground Self-Defense Forces in 
Kuwait.  Under a July 2003 law and the plan approved by the Cabinet, GSDF activities would 
be limited to humanitarian and reconstruction assistance involving medical services, water 
supply, and rehabilitation and maintenance of schools and other public facilities in southeast-
ern Iraq, an area thought to be a safe distance away from combat taking place in other parts of 
the country.    
 The special care in shaping the SDF mission was required by Article 9 of Japan’s Consti-
tution, which prohibits “the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” 
Despite the stated limitations on the SDF mission, many people believed the deployment vio-
lated Article 9.  When the troops departed, small groups gathered outside SDF bases to protest.
Tachikawa – “Raise your voices with us!”
 The day after the initial GSDF deployment (January 17) residents of an apartment com-
plex in the western outskirts of Tokyo found single-page flyers from an anti-war group called 
the “Tachikawa Tent Village” among the various items in their mailboxes and newspaper slots. 
The complex was made up of eight four-story apartment buildings; each building housed 24 
families.  These apartments looked no different from thousands of drab, anonymous structures 
found nearly everywhere around Tokyo, yet in one respect, they were very special:  the resi-
dents were members of the Self-Defense Forces and their families.  
 The flyers called upon them to join the anti-war activists in raising their voices against the 
 2 Press conference of Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi, December 9, 2003.  http://japan.kantei.go.jp/
koizumispeech/2003/12/09press_e.html (accessed Feb. 2, 2016); quoted in Michael Penn, Japan and the 
War on Terror (I.B.Tauris, 2014), p. 92. 
 3 There is a brief note in English and some photos from the Prime Minister’s visit to Komaki Air Base here: 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/koizumiphoto/2003/12/24komaki_e.html (accessed Mar. 1, 2016).  
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Iraq deployment.  The text made several points: the US intervention was governed by the self-
ish motivation of gaining control over oil supplies, 62 members of the Bulgarian force in Iraq 
had refused orders, and Defense Agency head Ishiba had said that SDF forces in Iraq should 
fire upon unidentified vehicles that approached their positions.  Members of the Tent Village 
(TV) regularly used a small van equipped with signboards and a loudspeaker to approach the 
gates of the Tachikawa Self-Defense Force base.  Was Ishiba suggesting that they be shot, too? 
In a final flourish the flyer declared “Before deciding that ‘orders are orders’, think about the 
meaning of each one.  If you disagree with this deployment, raise your voices together with 
us!”
 The flyers identified Tent Village as the author and provided two phone numbers for any-
one interested in contacting them, one for the TV office and the second for a “hotline” where 
individual SDF members could obtain counseling. 
 Residents had seen flyers with similar messages before.  It seems unlikely that many paid 
much attention.  Along with items regularly delivered by the postal service, their mailboxes at-
tracted unsolicited commercial flyers from real estate agents, fast food delivery services, and 
other junk mail.  These flyers apparently failed to get the response their authors sought.  There 
are no recorded instances of SDF members responding to the call.4 
 The January 17 delivery was the fourth in a monthly series of flyers planned by Tent Vil-
lage as a response to the Prime Minister’s unprecedented action.  Prior issues had already ir-
ritated some Self-Defense officers and residents.  Apartment managers were stirred to action. 
As the Cabinet and Self-Defense high command were finalizing plans for the Iraq deployment, 
building managers posted notices at various locations around the property prohibiting entry to 
unsolicited visitors.  The warnings were printed on standard A-3 size paper.  Along with park-
ing and panhandling, they prohibited “commercial activities, such as posting or distributing 
flyers.”  Moreover, managers notified the police of the intrusions and warned residents that if 
they saw anyone distributing “anti-SDF flyers” at the complex, they should telephone the po-
lice emergency line (110).5 
 Because the complex was not fully enclosed by a fence and was open to surrounding 
streets, there was a significant flow of non-residents through the property, including delivery-
men who distributed commercial flyers and neighbors who found shortcuts through the prop-
erty as they went about their business.  We do not know whether the new notices deterred any 
of these casual trespassers.
 Of course, anyone who saw a flyer from the peace activists, including the building man-
agers, police, or residents, could have simply called the number printed there and told them to 
back off.  But no one did.
 Although the flyers might seem insignificant, the leadership of Japan’s public security 
police viewed them as a very serious matter.  They searched the law for possible charges they 
could bring against these troublemakers. 
 4 Details are from Tokyo District Court, Hachioji Branch, Decision of Dec. 16, 2004 (Chief Judge Ken’ichi 
Hasegawa) (unreported).
 5 Id.
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Sapporo
 Meanwhile, far to the north on the island of Hokkaido, an elderly man who also opposed 
the SDF dispatch consulted attorneys to determine whether he could take legal action against 
the move.  Their discussion would lead to a suit filed in Sapporo District Court on January 28 
that sought a court order declaring the Iraq deployment in violation of the Constitution.  The 
plaintiff,  80 year-old Noboru Minowa, was not the average man-in-the-street.  Born and raised 
in Hokkaido, he had been elected to the national Diet eight times and represented residents 
of the Hokkaido first electoral district for 23 years.  He was even appointed to the Cabinet as 
Minister of Posts & Telecommunications by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki.  During much of 
his career he occupied senior positions concerned with national defense.  Of special interest to 
our story, he served as a vice-minister in the Defense Agency when the U.S. military returned 
Tachikawa Air Base to Japanese control in 1972, at the very time the “Tent Village” was born. 
It is commonly said that the core values of Japan’s 1947 Constitution are popular sovereignty, 
protection of individual rights, and pacifism.  The renunciation of war expressed in Article 9 is 
by far the most unusual feature.  Here is the complete text.
　　Article 9.  Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and or-
der, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and 
the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
　　In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belliger-
ency of the state will not be recognized. 
 There is some dispute over the origin of this provision.  In his memoirs, General Douglas 
MacArthur, the “Supreme Commander of Allied Powers,” attributed the idea to Prime Minister 
Kijūrō Shidehara.  But there is no doubt that it was MacArthur himself who insisted on renun-
ciation of war and demilitarization as a core provision of the Constitution.6  It is also beyond 
dispute that the actual text was reviewed and finalized by a newly-elected Japanese parliament 
in 1946 and then promulgated by Emperor Hirohito himself.
 Although Article 9 prohibits “war potential,” over the course of the postwar era Japan 
built one of the most sophisticated militaries in the world.  Throughout Minowa’s lifetime, ev-
ery Prime Minister and Cabinet consistently interpreted Article 9 to strictly limit the use of the 
Self-Defense Forces to Japan’s own defense.  The former Minister, viewed by many as a hawk 
on defense issues, had spent his entire career in the firm belief that the Constitution allowed 
only “exclusively defensive” (senshu bōei) military action.  He would not stand idly by as the 
Prime Minister overthrew this regime with an order sending the Self-Defense Forces to the far 
side of the globe to participate in a war that had nothing whatever to do with Japan’s national 
defense.  
 When this senior leader of the Sapporo community announced his desire to file suit, the 
 6 Ray A. MOORE & DONALD L. ROBINSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY, (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2002) p. 94.
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Sapporo Bar Association rallied to his side.7  Fully one-fourth of the members, more than one 
hundred attorneys in all, signed on to serve as his representatives.  
 Attorneys and peace activists around Japan pondered Minowa’s action and considered 
possible actions of their own.  He was not the only person contemplating a court challenge to 
the Iraq deployment. 
Nagoya
 Hajime Kawaguchi was born in 1972, the year that Minowa oversaw the transfer of the 
Tachikawa Base to the SDF and the demonstrators’ tents went up.  At the age of 24 he was 
severely injured in an automobile accident.  He survived and endured two years of rehabilita-
tion before returning to an ordinary daily life.  Inspired by this experience and by the attorney 
who represented him in subsequent litigation, Kawaguchi was determined to become a lawyer 
himself.  He passed the national bar exam and registered to practice in 2002.  When the Prime 
Minister ordered the SDF to Iraq, he was a fledgling attorney with less than two years experi-
ence under his belt.8  This lack of experience did not detain him from stepping forward to serve 
passionately as a leader of a suit filed in Nagoya that also sought a court judgment declaring 
the Iraq deployment unconstitutional.
 Waving off advice from elders that a suit like this was hopeless and would just be a waste 
of everyone’s time, Kawaguchi charged ahead.  The words of Article 9 are clear, he thought. 
If he failed to file suit in a case of such great importance to the nation, what was the point in 
having courts, anyway?  He knew that if he failed to act, he would never forgive himself.  The 
young advocate began by recruiting a highly respected veteran of numerous public interest 
suits to serve as the leader of an attorneys’ team.
 Yoshikazu Uchikawa, 67, was well-known as an advocate who had worked on many 
major cases brought against the government and big companies, including the Yokkaichi air 
pollution case, litigation filed against Mitsubishi and the State on behalf of young women who 
were forcibly brought from Korea during the war years to work in factories in the Nagoya 
area, and even a suit that sought compensation for people with claims arising from construc-
tion of Japan’s famous “bullet train”.9 
 Uchikawa explained why he took on the Iraq deployment case in a brief essay:  “[T]here 
is only one reason I have taken the position of lead counsel.  That is to protect the Constitution 
of Japan which has maintained peace in Japan for the past sixty years and to join hands with 
the many people who share the demand for world peace expressed in its Preamble.”  He added 
a personal note:10
 7 http://www.hg-law.jp/iraq/activity_01.html (accessed Feb. 29, 2016).  Minowa was later joined by several 
prominent local figures as co-plaintiffs.
 8 See Bengoshi to shite no genten to omoi at http://kawaguchihajime.com/kawaguchi.html.
 9 Kawaguchi speech, Sept 14, 2004 http://www.geocities.jp/iraqoka/sub12-kawaguti-p.html (accessed 
Feb. 29, 2016).
10 “Let’s achieve peace by pulling together!”  (Chikara wo awasete heiwa no jitsugen wo), Sashitome News, 
May 15, 2004.  (This was the inaugural issue of a newsletter produced by the plaintiffs’ group.), http://
www4.pf-x.net/~sashidome/nagoya_web/kaihou.htm.
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When the Second World War came to an end in 1945, I was in first grade.  Even now 
I remember my childhood thought that “now I don’t have to go to the battlefield.”  I 
first acquired a sense of dread about war because my aunt was killed by a bomb that 
fell near an airfield in Hamaguchi and our family of five wandered the roadsides af-
ter our house was burned in the firebombing.11
 There are probably committed pacifists and anti-war movements in every country on 
earth.  But Japan is a special case.  Nearly everyone of Uchikawa’s generation has a similar 
story to tell.  The Japanese people paid a very heavy price for their leaders’ disastrous deci-
sions to make war in Asia.  Schoolchildren everywhere learn that Japan suffered an attack by 
atomic weapons with the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the final days of the 
war.  But those horrifying acts are only part of the story.  
 In 1944, US B-29 heavy bombers commenced a series of brutal firebombing attacks on 
Japan, targeting sixty-six cities.  These attacks were highly effective; up to 40% of the targeted 
districts were completely destroyed.  We have only rough estimates of the scale of the loss of 
life – at least 300,000 dead and 400,000 injured.  As in the case of the atomic bombs, nearly all 
victims were non-combatants.  The most devastating of the attacks hit Tokyo on the night of 
March 9-10, 1945.  According to the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, the firestorm ignited by 
incendiary bombs delivered by more than 300 B-29s burned 15 square miles of the city to the 
ground in only six hours.  At least 100,000 died.12
   
 The pacifist policy of Constitution Article 9 is broadly supported by the people.  Leaders 
of Japan’s dominant political party have sought to revise Article 9 since the end of the war. 
Not long after the Constitution took effect, American political and military leaders labeled Ar-
ticle 9 a mistake.  But all opinion polls have consistently shown that a majority of the Japanese 
people want to keep its words unchanged.  Those of Uchikawa’s generation experienced war 
as an unmitigated disaster.  They see Article 9 as protection against its return.
 The charismatic Jun’ichiro Koizumi was perhaps the most popular Prime Minister of 
the modern era.  But even he could not persuade a majority of the public to support a change 
to Article 9 or his action in Iraq.  As Ground Self-Defense Force units were boarding aircraft 
bound for Iraq in mid-January 2004, a Kyodo News poll showed that 52% of respondents op-
posed the deployment and only 43% supported it.  More than 80% of the respondents felt that 
the Prime Minister had not sufficiently explained his decision.13 
 Attorneys who take on mass litigation in Japan typically form bengodan, teams of indi-
vidual attorneys who work from multiple offices.  A critical role is played by the jimukyoku-
chō, the chief administrative secretary.  This lawyer is responsible for all administrative duties, 
11 Id. 
12 Mark Selden, “A Forgotten Holocaust: US Bombing Strategy, the Destruction of Japanese Cities & the 
American Way of War from World War II to Iraq,” THE ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL Vol. 5, Issue 5 (posted on 
May 2, 2007).  Available at http://apjjf.org/site/view/2414?rand=1442343169&type=print&print=1#stha
sh.Gh7QHtZz.dpu. (accessed Jan. 31, 2016)
13 Penn, supra n. 2, p. 97, citing “Majority of Japanese against Sending SDF troops to Iraq: Kyodo Poll,” 
Kyodo News, Jan. 18, 2004. 
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including raising and managing funds, allocating work assignments, and making sure every 
document is delivered to the courthouse on time.  Kawaguchi took on this role in the Nagoya 
litigation.  He set about recruiting members in the aftermath of the Prime Minister’s December 
9 speech.  Within a week, he had signed up eighty lawyers to serve on the team, approximately 
10% of all lawyers registered to practice in Aichi Prefecture.
 Kawaguchi and his colleagues were intent on filing a suit similar to the Sapporo action. 
They commenced preparation in late 2003.  By mid-February, they had found 1,262 individu-
als ready to sign on as plaintiffs in an action against the State.  Kawaguchi and his colleagues 
filed the suit on behalf of the entire group in Nagoya District Court on February 23, 2004.
 The plaintiffs sought three elements of relief:  1) a court order blocking the Iraq deploy-
ment and ordering the return of the troops to Japan, 2) a declaration confirming that the Iraq 
deployment violates Constitution Article 9, and 3) compensation for emotional distress in the 
nominal amount of 10,000 yen (approx. US$ 94 at then-current exchange rates.)  In Japanese 
constitutional litigation it is standard practice to demand nominal compensation.  This opens 
the door for plaintiffs to offer evidence of their suffering and can act as protection against an 
early dismissal.
 Kawaguchi and the other leaders of the Nagoya litigation hoped the suit would become 
a rallying point for a national campaign against the Iraq deployment.  Their suit provided the 
opportunity for ordinary people otherwise without a voice to take concrete action.  Japan’s 
courtrooms provide ideal platforms for the attorneys to deliver the strongest possible constitu-
tional and other legal arguments and for plaintiffs to make statements of their own.  Attorney 
Kawaguchi traveled around Japan to exhort colleagues to join him in filing similar suits.  At a 
speech in Okayama, he said
　　We must raise voices from all over the country declaring that “Acts in violation 
of Article 9, the acts now conducted by the State are unacceptable and must never be 
allowed.  This truly violates our rights.  (The SDF) must return home right away.”  
Attorneys’ teams from around the country recognize that this is not the kind of case 
that can be won in a single court.  We cannot win this suit unless the State truly sees 
this issue with a sense of crisis and feels it cannot ignore us.14
Tachikawa – Police Investigate the “True Nature” of the Tent Village
 The police struck at 6:40 A.M. on Friday, February 27.
 Teams armed with search and arrest warrants pounded doors and demanded access at six 
locations.  In addition to the Tent Village office, they appeared at the homes of several mem-
bers.  The three members who had distributed flyers on January 17 were arrested on suspicion 
of criminal trespass.  Police squads conducted searches and seized computers, diaries and cal-
endars, files and other materials.
 The police also alerted television crews to the early morning raid so the public could 
watch the forces of law and order in action.  A Kyodo reporter who served on a committee that 
14 Kawaguchi speech, supra, n. 9.
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studied the effect of news media practices on human rights severely criticized the behavior of 
the television crews invited to report the event:
　　On the day of the arrests, Fuji Television and TBS (Tokyo Broadcasting Sys-
tem) camera crews were in place in front of the Tent Village office from early morn-
ing.  Their reports strictly followed the line set by the police reflecting the viewpoint 
of the public security division.  They reported the actual names of the suspects in-
cluded in the police announcement and followed the standard ‘crime report’ format, 
disclosing ages, addresses and other information concerning the suspects.  Fuji Tele-
vision in particular, showed a scene where one TV member was being led away by 
the police; incredibly, they blurred the facial images of police officers while provid-
ing a clear close-up of the TV member, even taking the trouble to show the scene in 
slow motion.  
　　Although TBS did protect the identities of the suspects, they wrapped up their 
report with this statement: “On high alert against possible terror attacks at a time 
when Self-Defense Forces have been deployed to Iraq, the Tokyo Metropolitan Po-
lice Department (keishi-cho) are seeking to clarify the true nature of this group.”15
 This was surely one of the easiest police investigations conducted anywhere in the world 
that year.  The Tent Village had been operating in the open for more than three decades.  De-
spite the group’s name, in February 2004 there were no actual tents.  There never had been 
a real “village.”  But Tent Village members continued to honor the memory of the group’s 
Vietnam War-era roots with their name.  Toward the end of 1972, at a time when the country 
was engulfed in demonstrations against the Vietnam War and unbridled government authority, 
protesters in the Tachikawa area had put up a cluster of tents to serve as their base for anti-war 
demonstrations in the area.  According to one Tent Village member, “The first residents of the 
Tachikawa Tent Village were high school and college students, young residents of newly built 
apartment blocks (danchi), and young workers.”16  
 Local protesters built this “village” when they learned that the Americans were about to 
evacuate Tachikawa Air Base and hand it over to Japan’s Self-Defense Forces.  No one knew 
how long U.S. military forces might remain deployed in Japan, but an SDF base would surely 
be permanent.  Protesters sought to block the establishment of such a permanent military base 
in their midst.  After the SDF takeover was completed in 1973, the tents gradually disappeared.
 Through the decades that followed, the Tent Village group had somehow managed to sur-
vive, but it had shriveled to a mere shadow of its former existence.  A 2004 account described 
the group this way,  
　　There are no written rules governing Tent Village and the conditions and format 
for entry and retirement from membership are not clearly defined.  Individuals who 
attend weekly meetings and participate in writing the monthly newsletter are recog-
nized as members.  In that sense, the current membership is seven persons....  In re-
15 Hiroaki Nakajima, “Dan’atsu wo menzai suru ‘muzai hanketsu’ banzai hōdō,” in TACHIKAWA HANSEN BI-
RA-IRE JIKEN (Akashi Shoten, 2005) (hereinafter “TACHIKAWA JIKEN”), p. 129.
16 Katsuko Kato, “Watakushitachi ha naze jieikan he bira wo kubaru no ka,” id., p. 15.
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cent years, membership has generally fluctuated at a level of fewer than ten persons.  
However, some who who cooperate with Tent Village activities consider themselves 
members, so the line that separates members from non-members can be vague.  
Among the members, there are some who hold the position of group representative; 
however there are no differences in relationships of authority or duties, and no rela-
tionships of control or obedience.  The management and policies of Tent Village are 
decided at the meetings described above.17
 The headcount included the three members arrested on February 27, so the police raid 
wiped out nearly half of the group’s total strength.  Members were said to be supported by an 
unknown number of people who sometimes attended meetings, made monetary contributions 
or otherwise helped out.  To finance their operations, the group raised between 100,000 and 
400,000 yen per month (approx. US $ 940-3,760 in Feb. 2004).18
 The three suspects, two men and a woman, were confined in local police jails.  Among 
them, the oldest was a man in his mid-forties who was employed as a middle school cook.  He 
had joined a Tent Village study group as a college student in 1978 and became a formal mem-
ber the following year.
 The second male suspect, about a decade younger, was a manager in a company that pro-
vided services for the aged.  His first contact was at a demonstration organized by Tent Village 
when he was a college student in 1992.  In 2001 or 2002, he began to attend weekly meetings 
and pay dues, and became a key Tent Village member.
 The third suspect, the youngest of the three, was a woman who worked as a helper for the 
physically handicapped.  She became acquainted with Tent Village members when she partici-
pated in a local autumn festival they helped to organize in 1999 or 2000.  At the time of the ar-
rests, she resided in the Tent Village office. 
 According to standard Japanese procedure, the police can hold suspects for 24 hours be-
fore obtaining the approval of the local prosecutors’ office.  Prosecutors have the power to de-
tain for an additional 48 hours.  If they wish to hold  suspects beyond that time, they must get 
the approval of a judge.
Tokyo – the Professors Speak Out
 The Tachikawa arrests sent shock waves through Japan’s legal community.  The govern-
ment professed to lead a constitutional democracy and the Constitution had declared unam-
biguous protection for free speech since 1947.  Distributing paper flyers is one of the simplest 
and most fundamental means for ordinary citizens to have a voice.  But now the three peace 
activists sat in jail cells.  One prominent lawyer would later write a pamphlet with the plaintive 
17 Tokyo District Court, Hachioji Branch, Decision of Dec. 16, 2004 (Chief Judge Ken’ichi Hasegawa) (un-
reported).
18 Id. 
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title, “Is This a Crime?”19
 While the Tachikawa suspects stewed in their jail cells and maintained silence during 
lengthy interrogation sessions, several antiwar groups issued formal denunciations of the po-
lice action.  On March 3, they were joined by an ad hoc group of 53 law professors led by 
Manabu Ishizaki, a 35-year old assistant professor at a small private university.  In just a few 
days, the junior scholar had gathered a long list of colleagues, including well-known consti-
tutional experts at Japan’s most prestigious universities, such as Masajiro Sakaguchi of Hito-
tsubashi University and Asaho Mizushima of Waseda. The most prominent name on the list 
was that of Yasuhiro Okudaira, a retired Tokyo University professor who was revered in Ja-
pan’s legal community as the nation’s greatest expert on the constitutional right of free speech.
 Professor Ishizaki announced the declaration at a small press conference held in Tachika-
wa on March 3.  The Asahi carried a brief report in its evening edition the following day.
  
 The scholars feared that the police action would “restrict the valid speech activities of the 
people and have a chilling effect on democratic society.”  The suspects had been arrested on 
charges of illegal trespass, but the scholars doubted that such a charge could stand.20  Under 
the standard interpretation of this law, they said, its purpose was to protect the peaceful use of 
a defined space in which residents could expect to enjoy privacy by keeping outsiders from 
entering without permission.  How could these three individuals be arrested for the act of slip-
ping flyers into a mailbox, they asked.  The very purpose of a mailbox is to enable people to 
maintain the privacy of their residential space while providing a conduit to the outside world 
to enable residents to receive information.  Placing flyers into this conduit could not possibly 
be considered to invade the privacy of the residents.
 “Inasmuch as these acts do not fulfill the requirements of Article 130 of the Criminal 
Code,” they wrote, “there is sufficient ground to suspect that the (police) action has a different 
purpose.”  Different purpose? According to the professors, “it must be to prohibit direct con-
tact between citizens and members of the SDF and their families at the time of the Iraq deploy-
ment.”  
 The statement explained that the obvious motivation of the suspects was to engage in a 
discussion with the residents over the Iraq action.  “The means used, the placement in mail-
boxes – a space providing an opening to the outside world of the common media of printed 
flyers – is very moderate (kiwamete onken),” they wrote.  “Considering that the content of the 
flyers concerned only the Iraq deployment – ‘let’s consider this together and oppose it’ (tomo 
ni kangae, hantai shiyō) – they wrote that the flyers could not violate the individual legal in-
terests of the residents and that to cut off communications with the residents by imposing the 
extreme measure of criminal prosecution would cause extreme damage to the “clarity, stability, 
and predictability” of the law, would have a chilling effect on free communications among the 
people and carried the risk of causing injury to the democratic process itself. 
19 Masatoshi Uchida, Kore ga Hanzai? ［Bira Kubari de taiho］wo Kangaeru (Is This a Crime? Thinking 
About “Arrests for Handing Out Flyers”) (IWANAMI BOOKLET NO. 655, 2005). 
20 Article 130 of Japan’s Criminal Code provides “A person who, without justifiable grounds, trespasses at 
a residence of another person or into the premises, building or vessel guarded by another person, or who 
refuses to leave such a place upon demand shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more 
than three years or a fine of not more than 100,000 yen.”
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 “We must conclude,” they wrote, that “the true purpose of this action, aimed at a citizens 
group that expresses opposition to the SDF deployment to Iraq, was to restrict the free speech 
rights” of that group.  They called for the immediate release of the suspects.21
Tokyo – Tsukijima
 On the very day the professors held this press conference, the public security police 
sprang into action in a residential district of Tokyo.  This time their target was an employee of 
the national Social Insurance Agency, a specialist on public pension claims.  
 When Akio Horikoshi, 50, opened his door on the morning of March 3 he found eight po-
lice officers with warrants in hand.  They arrested him on the spot and searched his residence, 
confiscating 27 files and documents.  Horikoshi was handcuffed and paraded before television 
cameras waiting outside his door.22  Like the Tachikawa suspects, he was suspected of illegally 
distributing printed material.  But whereas the Tachikawa suspects were accused of trespass, 
the police had a more convenient law to apply in this case.  
 Japan’s National Public Employees Law strictly prohibits government workers from en-
gaging in political activities.23  Key language in Article 102 of that Law states that “apart from 
exercising their right to vote,” government employees “must not engage in political acts as 
prescribed by the National Personnel Authority.”  When this law was adopted in the Occupa-
tion era, the NPA designated a long list of activities defined as prohibited “political acts.”  The 
list includes such matters as forming political organizations or serving as an officer, collecting 
funds for such groups, and “publishing, editing, or distributing” their newspapers or other pub-
lications.  Violations can be prosecuted as crimes punishable by fines and imprisonment of up 
to three years.24  
 The application of these strict rules to prohibit political speech by government employees 
was challenged in a series of prosecutions in the 1960s.  At least three lower courts tossed out 
prosecutions for such acts as distributing flyers, putting up posters and participating in rallies 
on the ground that the constitutional guarantee of free speech protected such activities.25  But 
in a stunning reversal, in a case known as the “Sarufutsu Judgment,” in November 1974 the 
Supreme Court overturned the acquittals and judged all defendants guilty, effectively imposing 
an absolute ban on political speech by government workers. 
 The Court held that, despite the free speech guarantee in the Constitution, prosecution of 
these individuals was appropriate because “the parliamentary system requires that public em-
ployees carry out policies passed into law by the Diet and that they maintain political neutral-
ity in order to keep the trust of the people in the political impartiality of government admin-
21 “Law Scholars’ Declaration Against Suppression of the Tachikawa Self-Defense Force Surveillance Tent 
Village,” (立川自衛隊監視テント村への弾圧に抗議する法学者声明) March 3, 2004.  (reproduced at pp. 
214-15, TACHIKAWA JIKEN)
22 This description of the arrest is from Yoshinori Shibata and Tetsu Funao, Shakaihokenchō shokuin 
kokkōhō ihan/horikoshi jiken, in DOKYUMENTO SAIBAN TO JINKEN (NIHON HYORONSHA, 2009), p. 143.
23 National Public Employees Law (kokka komuin ho), Law No. 120 of 1947.
24 National Personnel Authority Rule ( jinjiin kisoku) 14-7. (1949)
25 There are brief English language descriptions of these cases at LAWRENCE W. BEER, FREEDOM OF EXPRES-
SION IN JAPAN (KODANSHA, 1984), p. 236.
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istration.”  In order to “keep the trust of the people,” the Court upheld a complete ban on acts 
listed in the NPA regulations by all workers subject to the national public employees law. 
 Japan’s leading constitutional scholars have bitterly attacked this decision as an unaccept-
ably tight limitation on free speech.  The real issue in the case was whether the defendants’ 
specific actions had actually caused suspicion regarding the political neutrality of government 
workers.  As in the Horikoshi case, there was no evidence that this was so.  Rather than con-
sidering the concrete facts, however, the Supreme Court simply accepted the abstract concept 
that all acts listed by the NPA would be irreversibly presumed to cause doubt over government 
neutrality.  Therefore, all such acts should be banned.
 The eminent Tokyo University scholar Nobuyoshi Ashibe labeled the decision a “turning 
point in the history of Japan’s constitutional case law.”  Commenting on the application of the 
Sarufutsu rule in the Horikoshi case, Yasuhiro Okudaira wrote that “[f]rom the time this deci-
sion was issued until the present, it (Sarufutsu decision) continues to be regarded among con-
stitutional scholars as one of the Court’s worst judgments.”26  
 The Supreme Court’s rejection of the constitutional claims in the Sarufutsu case is one 
of many in which the Court has administered defeats to free speech proponents.  Although Su-
preme Court judgments often declare that freedom of speech is an “especially important” right 
in Japan’s constitutional scheme, the Court has never actually ruled that any action of the po-
lice or other government authority has violated those important rights.  Among leading cases in 
this area, the Sarufutsu decision has an especially bad reputation among constitutional experts. 
It is generally believed that longstanding criticism of that decision is one reason there had been 
no further prosecutions against government employees under these rules – until Horikoshi’s 
arrest in 2004.
 As an employee of the Social Insurance Agency, Horikoshi was surely bound by the 
restriction on political acts.  The importance the police attached to this case was well demon-
strated by the resources they allocated to track him down.  
 According to an intensive police investigation, Horikoshi had secretly used his time off 
on three dates in October and November, all national holidays, to distribute newsletters and 
other material as a volunteer for a local office of the Japan Communist Party (JCP).  In later 
court testimony, a patrolman stated that the surveillance of Horikoshi began on April 19, 2003, 
eleven months before his actual arrest.27  After a few weeks the police dropped this initial sur-
veillance, but they resumed it in the autumn as voters prepared to face a national election.  Af-
ter the Diet was dissolved in October, a formal surveillance team was established with a total 
of twelve members to tail the public pension adviser.  The team included seven officers from 
the public security division of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department (keishi-cho), and 
26 Professor Ashibe explains that prior to the Sarufutsu decision, many lower courts had adopted a “strict 
scrutiny” doctrine requiring the state to show that it had used the “least restrictive alternative” (com-
monly referred to as the “LRA standard” in Japan) in restricting speech.  This approach matched the 
practice of courts in the United States and other western democracies.  The Sarufutsu decision, which 
overturned the lower courts’ decisions and held that a complete and uniform ban on political activities 
was constitutional, stopped this movement in its tracks. Lawrence Repeta, “Reserved Seats on Japan’s 
Supreme Court,” WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, VOL. 88, NO. 6 (2011), pp. 1739-41.   
27 Tetsu Nakajima Seminar Students, Ima futatabi odokasareru hyogen no jiyuu – shakai hokencho shokuin 
jiken, 615 HOGAKU SEMINAR (March 2006).
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five from the local Tsukijima police station.
 This team commenced an intensive period of surveillance in October, with several un-
dercover officers following the suspect on a daily basis for a full month.  The diligent efforts 
of these officers revealed that from 12:03 to 12:33 on the afternoon of October 19, the suspect 
delivered the JCP newspaper and other materials to 13 mailboxes; from 10:11 until 10:15 on 
the morning of October 25, to 56 mailboxes; and from 10:06 until 10:18 on the morning of 
November 3, to 57 boxes.28  All deliveries had taken place at residential buildings located in 
the Chuo-ku district on islands in Tokyo Bay not far from the downtown Ginza shopping area. 
(Unlike the Tachikawa defendants, Horikoshi did not enter the corridors of these buildings; he 
simply deposited the materials in central banks of mailboxes on the ground floor.)
 In the course of this exercise the police use concealed cameras to create at least 33 video 
recordings.  The videos showed not only the suspect’s suspicious meanderings when he might 
be delivering prohibited materials, but also his meetings with friends and acquaintances at 
restaurants and other places.29  On some days as many as eleven undercover officers and four 
vehicles were involved in the surveillance.30  
 The arrest was made four months after this surveillance was concluded.  
Tokyo – the News Media
 The editors of the Asahi Shimbun, Japan’s flagship liberal newspaper, weighed in on the 
Tachikawa case two days after the professors’ declaration.  In an editorial published on March 
5 they set out some basic facts that would be repeated many times in the coming days.  The 
suspects were not intrusive and made no attempt to conceal their activities.  They appeared at 
mid-day, dropped their flyers through the mail slots and then left.  The flyers themselves iden-
tified their group and provided contact information.  In the opinion of the Asahi Shimbun, facts 
like these provided no justification for a police raid and confiscation of notebooks, computers 
and other material.  The editorial expressed suspicion not only of the police action, but also of 
the judges who issued such arrest and search warrants.  What could they possibly be thinking?  
The mailboxes also collected unsolicited material from restaurants, real estate agents, and oth-
ers.  Were the police planning raids on those establishments, too?  “Not likely,” according to 
the Asahi. “It appears that the police decided to make these arrests because the flyers expressed 
opposition to the SDF deployment.”  The editors expressed their fear that “in the face of this 
vigorous police action, citizens will hesitate to express their opinions or attend public gather-
ings.”  This result is what constitutional scholars call the “chilling effect.”　It appears to be 
precisely the effect sought by the public security police.
 The editorial concluded with a classic call on government to honor fundamental demo-
cratic principles.
　　Mutual recognition of values that are different from one’s own.  The right to 
freely express one’s opinion.  These are the premises on which a democratic society 
28 These facts are recorded in the Tokyo District Court decision issued on June 29, 2006.
29 Uchida, IWANAMI BOOKLET NO. 655, supra n. 19, p. 14.
30 Shiro Okubo, Ima futatabi odokasareru hyōgen no jiyū – soshō no gendankai to sōten, 615 HOGAKU 
SEMINAR 53 (March 2006).
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is based.
　　In particular, when we consider an issue like the deployment of the SDF to Iraq, 
we cannot avoid touching on the pacifist principles of the Constitution.  This is a 
serious issue which can set the direction of Japan’s future course.  This is not some-
thing that can just be left to politicians and bureaucrats.  It is important that people 
be free to express their opinions and listen to the differing opinions of others. 
　　Isn’t this the kind of democratic society, complete with freedom of speech, that 
international society seeks to build in Iraq?31   
Tokyo – School Graduations
 The Japanese school year begins with the cherry blossoms of April and ends with gradu-
ation ceremonies the following March.  Like school graduations anywhere, they are joyous 
events where students, teachers and family members celebrate the students’ achievements and 
consider their dreams for the future.  In Japan’s public schools, these celebrations are some-
what more disciplined and restrained than they may be elsewhere, with all students attired in 
uniforms, and activities bound within rigidly fixed agendas of speeches and other rituals.  In 
March 2004, the atmosphere at public school ceremonies was especially tense.  In response to 
demands from local rightwing politicians and activists, on October 23, 2003, the director of 
education for the Tokyo school district had issued a new order concerning the display of the 
national flag and performance of kimigayo, Japan’s national anthem.  Of special concern, the 
order required all schoolteachers to stand respectfully and sing the words of kimigayo.  This 
order was sure to be contested.  
 The national flag and anthem are the most inflammatory symbols of Japan’s imperialist 
era.　Many schoolteachers and other Japanese oppose the flag-and-anthem rituals because 
they view such ceremonies as a revival of the rituals that attended the divine emperor in Ja-
pan’s disastrous age of militarism.  The stark hinomaru flag featuring a red sun against a field 
of white is the same standard that was carried by imperial forces as they marched across the 
Asian land mass and the islands of the western Pacific.32
 The kimigayo hymn is even more controversial.  Its brief lyrics can be traced to a simple 
poem preserved more than a thousand years ago that call for an eternal imperial reign.33  These 
words were set to music in the early Meiji era as one element of a broader program to enhance 
the status of the emperor, who was proclaimed to be the divine descendant of the gods.34 After 
the war, the power of these national symbols was deemed so great by Allied authorities that 
31 ビラ配りでなぜ逮捕　派遣反対（社説）Asahi Shimbun, March 5, 2004.
32 It is thought to have first appeared on military standards of ancient Japanese warriors.
  Mayumi Itoh, “Japan’s Neo-Nationalism: The Role of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo Legislation,” avail-
able at http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp79.html (accessed November 30, 2014).
33 The lyrics together with a common translation follow. 
 　　Kimi ga yo wa  　His majestic reign
 　　chiyo ni yachiyo ni  　for thousands of years
 　　sazare ishi no iwao to narite 　a pebble grows into a rock
 　　koke no musu made  　until covered with moss
 The text is believed to date to the 10th Century. Itoh, id. 
34 MARIUS JANSEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN, (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2000), p. 475.
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they prohibited their use during the Occupation.
 Japan’s nationalistic political leaders have long been determined to revive these symbols. 
But opposition has been so great that they were unable to pass national legislation formally es-
tablishing them as Japan’s national flag and anthem until 1999.  Even that law did not require 
that the symbols actually be used in public ceremonies or any other way.  Moreover, during 
Diet interpellations on the 1999 law, the Minister of Education and other Obuchi Administra-
tion spokesmen assured Diet members and the public that participation in flag-and-anthem 
ceremonies would not be mandatory.35 
 Then the scene shifted to local governments around the country where rightwing activ-
ists demanded that the flag and anthem be included in school ceremonies.  Tensions ran so 
high that in 1999 the principal of a Hiroshima high school chose suicide to escape them.  After 
more than a decade of such confrontations, the nationalists’ campaign to revive the symbols 
reached a crescendo with the order of the Tokyo director of education on October 23, 2003 (the 
“Order”).36 
 That Order specified that the hinomaru be prominently displayed at school ceremonies 
and that the master of ceremonies call for everyone present to stand before the flag and sing 
kimigayo.  Moreover, the Order stated that all school principals were to notify teachers and 
staff that anyone who did not follow these orders would be held responsible. 
 In accordance with these instructions, the hinomaru flag was displayed center stage at 
Tokyo school assemblies in March 2004.  But when masters of ceremonies called for all to rise 
that year, hundreds of school teachers around the city defied the Order and remained seated. 
When the dignified tones of kimigayo were played and others sang the words, these teachers 
remained silent.
 The leaders of Tokyo’s educational establishment expected this disobedience and were 
well prepared.  Officials posted at school ceremonies around the city took meticulous notes, 
identifying teachers who refused to take part.  Published accounts report that officials named 
243 teachers and staff members who declined to participate.  Many of these teachers were for-
mally reprimanded and subject to other punishments.  Those who persisted in subsequent years 
suffered more severe penalties, including retaliatory transfers, financial penalties, and removal 
from classrooms.37
 Many teachers challenged these punishments in court and some of their cases ultimately 
reached the Supreme Court.  Work on these cases would occupy lawyers and courts for years 
to come.  But there was one case that was quite different from the rest.  This one involved the 
police and a criminal prosecution.
35 Lawrence Repeta, “‘Personal Information,’ Media Control, and Government Power – Legislative Battles 
in Japan, 1999-2003,” 22 MEIJI LAW J. 9, 10 (2015).
36 “Concerning the implementation of raising of the national flag and singing the national anthem at en-
trance ceremonies, graduation ceremonies and other events,” (Nyūgakushiki, sotsugyōshikitō ni okeru 
kokki keiyō oyobi kokka seishō no jisshi ni tsuite (tsutatsu)) Yokichi Yokoyama, Chairperson, Tokyo 
Board of Education, October 23, 2003.
37 Tōru Kondo, “The eight year fight over the October 23 order – seeking withdrawal of these dispositions” 
(10・23 tsūtatsu wo meguru hachinenkan no tatakai – shobun tekkai wo motomete), Hō to Minshushugi 
(Law and Democracy), No. 465, January 2012.
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Tokyo – Itabashi High School
 Katsuhisa Fujita’s career as a high school social science teacher came to an end when he 
reached mandatory retirement age in 2002.  In his final appointment, from April 1995 through 
March 2002, he was employed at Itabashi High School in Tokyo.38  The Itabashi district is on 
Tokyo’s northern fringe, facing Saitama Prefecture across the Arakawa River.  Residents take 
rides of a half-hour or so in crowded commuter trains to get to jobs in central Tokyo.  
 Fujita was invited by former students to attend their graduation ceremony to be held on 
March 11, 2004.  He had served as counselor for many of them when they were in the 10th 
grade.  He was especially excited at the prospect of hearing a piano performance by a former 
student with vision difficulties.  During his time at Itabashi High, people said that Fujita some-
times helped this student cross the street.39  
 Fujita believed that school graduations are a special opportunity for students to take the 
spotlight and should be free of any kind of coercion by school authorities.40  He was dismayed 
to learn of the October 2003 order.  When he attended the graduation ceremony in March, he 
was determined to remain seated during kimigayo and to encourage others to follow his ex-
ample.  As guests were settling into their seats before the ceremony began, Fujita stood and 
addressed the people around him, explaining that a new order required teachers to stand and 
sing kimigayo even though it might be against their will.  He implored guests to support the 
teachers by remaining seated during kimigayo and he distributed copies of a weekly magazine 
that described the order.  But Fujita was soon stopped by the school principal and other admin-
istrators and escorted out of the auditorium.  The ceremony commenced after his departure.
 When kimigayo was played, however, with a few exceptions, the graduating seniors re-
fused to stand.  Addressing the students, the vice principal declared “Those who do not truly 
have conflicts of thought and belief should stand.”  With a great deal more vigor, a member of 
the Tokyo metropolitan assembly who represents the Itabashi district repeatedly yelled at the 
students to stand up.
 Katsuhisa Fujita did not see the students’ act of defiance himself because he had been re-
moved from the building.  Nonetheless, for him, the story was far from over.
 Tokyo Education Director Yokichi Yokoyama, the author of the “October 23 Order,” ap-
peared as a witness at an assembly meeting held less than a week after the Itabashi graduation. 
There he was addressed by Takayuki Tsuchiya, the member who had shouted at the students. 
“I attended the graduation ceremony at Itabashi High,” Tsuchiya said.  “When the national an-
them was played, all teachers stood up, but nearly all of the students remained seated.  As the 
Tokyo Director of Education, how do you view this strange state of affairs?”
 Director Yokoyama responded that this situation violated Japan’s curriculum guide-
lines (gakushū shidō yōryō) and he would conduct an investigation.  He also said that, in 
order to prevent the spread of this problem, he had already sent instructions to all Tokyo high 
38 “板橋高校卒業式事件,” Wikipedia, https://ja.wikipedia.org.
39 http://www.news-pj.net/npj/2007/itabashikoukou-20071113.html. (accessed Jan. 31, 2016)
40 Jiro Tsuda, Tōritsu itabashi kōkō sotsugyōshiki jiken http://www.jicl.jp/now/saiban/backnumber/itabashi.
html (accessed Feb. 28, 2016).
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schools to hold ceremonies in accordance with the October 23 Order.
 Assembly member Tsuchiya was not quite satisfied.  When he suggested that teachers 
should be punished if their students refuse to stand, Yokoyama agreed.41
 In response to a request filed by Tokyo education authorities (higai todoke), a squad of 
police appeared at Itabashi High School on March 26 to take statements from individuals with 
knowledge of the graduation incident.  According to the Asahi, about twenty Itabashi High 
alumni gathered at the school entrance to protest the police incursion that day.  They didn’t 
think Fujita had caused a problem.  The Asahi quoted one young woman: “I didn’t have much 
interest in the ‘hinomaru/kimigayo issue.’  After studying it, I didn’t think this is something 
that should be compelled.  There are opinions for and against.  If you sing just because you 
have to, this doesn’t lead to patriotism.”  Another said simply “If you want to sing, then you 
should sing.  If not, you should be free not to sing.”42
 Tokyo’s nationalistic governor Shintaro Ishihara expressed a different opinion at a regu-
larly scheduled press conference the same day.  “Educators must follow rules set by authori-
ties like the State and the metropolitan government.  After all, obedience itself is at the core of 
education.”  It was Ishihara who had appointed the members of the Tokyo education commit-
tee that had approved the March 23 Order and he had frequently commented on its importance. 
According to the governor, “In order for Japan to be respected in international society, it is im-
portant that the national hymn and flag are properly recognized and respected.”43  
   
 By May 21, the police were ready to move.  They sprang an early morning raid on Fuji-
ta’s home that day.44  The intrusive police search was similar to the police action that launched 
the Tachikawa and Horikoshi prosecutions.  
 I have been unable to ascertain what incriminating evidence the police expected to find 
at the home of the retired high school teacher.  As in the Tachikawa and Horikoshi cases, the 
police had somehow persuaded a judge to issue a search warrant.  The procedure for obtaining 
such a warrant seems to be strictly pro forma.  In 2006, for example, Japanese courts issued 
206,703 search and seizure warrants.  In 2,626 cases, requests were withdrawn.  Courts denied 
requests in only 41 cases (approximately 0.02 percent of all cases.) 
 The police did not take Mr. Fujita into custody on the day of the search.  
Tokyo – Article 9 Litigation
 All Japanese attorneys are required to be members of both a prefectural bar association 
and the national bar association.  Each prefecture has one bar association except for metropoli-
tan Tokyo, which has three.  The offices of all three Tokyo bar associations and the national 
41 Details concerning the Tokyo metropolitan assembly meeting are from Uchida, IWANAMI BOOKLET NO. 655 
supra n. 19, pp. 11-12.  Uchida writes that more than ninety percent of the graduates refused to stand.   
42 Asahi Shimbun, Mar. 27, 2004, p. 38 and April 7, 2004, p.2.  (These articles do not explain how the stu-
dents and news reporters knew the police would be at the school that day.)
43 Asahi Shimbun, April 7, 2004, p. 2.
44 Uchida, IWANAMI BOOKLET NO. 655 supra n. 19, p. 11.
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organization are housed in a twenty story building in central Tokyo that looks out upon Hibiya 
Park, the Imperial Hotel, and other grand buildings.
 About thirty writers and lawyers opposed to the Iraq deployment gathered there on the 
afternoon of March 17, 2004.  They were aware of the suits filed in Sapporo and Nagoya and 
they were prepared to take action in Tokyo.  The group included representatives of pacifist and 
religious groups and some of Japan’s best-known left-wing writers and commentators.  A num-
ber of them had filed suits charging the government with violating Article 9 before, in cases 
involving Japan’s financial contributions to the 1991 Gulf War, participation in U.N. peace-
keeping operations in Cambodia, and other actions.  But all of these cases were dismissed on 
the ground that the plaintiffs did not have a sufficiently direct and concrete legal interest.  The 
Tokyo activists were deeply frustrated and dissatisfied by this reaction of the courts.  They de-
cided to try something different.
 Lawyers in Sapporo and Nagoya had gathered in large numbers to form traditional bengo-
dan, ad hoc teams of lawyers led by respected senior attorneys that merged the efforts and sup-
port of dozens of lawyers working from law offices around each city.  This was the standard 
format in major public interest litigation, including the cases they had filed and lost. 
 For the Iraq deployment litigation, the Tokyo group would employ a “relay” strategy de-
signed to survive the expected negative attitude from the courts.  There would not be one big 
suit, but many small ones.  Plaintiffs would not form a group; instead each would file a sepa-
rate suit of his or her own.  Of course, the legal issues in all the cases would be the same, but 
each plaintiff would be free to present his case in his own way.  The goal of this “daily litiga-
tion movement” (mainichi mainichi teisō undō) was to have one member file a suit every day 
(except weekends and holidays) until the SDF was brought home.  The relay approach had a 
special advantage.  Every time a judge dismissed one suit (because the plaintiff did not have a 
sufficiently direct interest or for any other reason), the baton would be passed and another suit 
would appear in its place.
 Some of the plaintiffs themselves were lawyers, but the basic idea was that each plaintiff 
would file a suit on his own, without legal representation.  In order to assist first-time litigants, 
the group even produced a “how to” video to show them the ropes.45
 After discussing their plans at the Bar Association building on March 17, the group 
marched across the open space between the Bar Association and the adjacent Tokyo District 
Courthouse, filed the first suit, and then held a press conference at the reporters’ club on the 
second floor of the courthouse.  Speakers told the assembled reporters they had already gath-
ered more than eighty names of willing plaintiffs.  The timing of this suit fell nearly on the 
first anniversary of the March 20, 2003 launch of the Bush Administration invasion of Iraq.
 The first suit was filed by a well-known commentator on defense issues named Tetsuo 
Maeda.  
Tachikawa  –  the Indictment
 According to Article 38 of Japan’s Constitution, “No person shall be compelled to testify 
45 http://comcom.jca.apc.org/iken_tokyo/info/f_keika.html.
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against himself.”  In other words, suspects enjoy a right to remain silent.  The way this funda-
mental right is interpreted in Japan, however, even though suspects declare they will not speak, 
interrogations continue unimpeded.46  The three Tachikawa suspects were held in cells at local 
police stations throughout their detention.  They all declared an intention to remain silent, but 
they were nonetheless led to interrogation cells every day where they were strapped into chairs 
and prosecutors and police investigators questioned and yelled at them for hour after hour.
 Supporters of the Tachikawa suspects were able to find lawyers to visit them on the day 
of the arrests.  But the options available to Japan’s defense lawyers are limited.  They can visit 
their clients in police custody, but are not allowed to be present during interrogations.
 There are no records of what takes place in Japan’s interrogation cells except for state-
ments drafted by prosecutors.  The bar associations and others concerned with the rights of 
criminal suspects have long demanded that interrogations be videotaped as they are in other 
countries, but the police and prosecutors have successfully resisted them.  Thus, they are free 
to pressure suspects to talk without fear that evidence of embarrassing and perhaps abusive 
practices may be preserved in a video recording.  In the words of Professor Setsuo Miyazawa, 
“[T]he accused must defend himself against the efforts of the police to obtain a confession; 
he must survive without the assistance of a lawyer in an environment totally controlled by the 
police.”47  Under these circumstances, nearly all suspects confess.
 Because they were unable to visit their three comrades during the interrogation period, 
other Tent Village members and their friends sometimes paraded in front of the jail with loud-
speakers, cheering the captives and chanting against the Iraq deployment.  Although the sus-
pects could not see their friends, they could hear them making a ruckus outside and they would 
later say that this was a real source of strength.  
 The coercive interrogation system is highly effective in most cases.  But the Tachikawa 
suspects were committed peace activists accused only of slipping political flyers into mailbox-
es.  Tent Village members had been doing precisely the same thing for decades and they were 
proud of this work.  In this case there was no real dispute over the facts, except for one impor-
tant unanswered question:  which of the Tent Village members delivered the flyers on January 
17?  As in all cases, the prosecutors sought a confession.  But these suspects refused to speak. 
 Under Japan’s rules of criminal procedure, the government can ordinarily detain suspects 
under these conditions for up to 23 days without formally charging them of a crime.  As noted 
earlier, after 72 hours in custody, prosecutors are required to obtain judicial approval for fur-
ther confinement.  Decisions on these requests are usually made in closed hearings in which 
defense counsel are not present.  It is a rare day that sees a Japanese judge refuse a prosecu-
tor’s request for extended detention.  Judges are empowered to grant two ten-day extensions 
before an indictment must be filed.
46 Professor Foote suggests that, under the prevailing interpretation of Japanese law, suspects are saddled 
with a duty to submit to interrogations. Daniel H. Foote, “Policymaking by the Japanese Judiciary in the 
Criminal Justice Field,” 72 HōSHAKAIGAKU 6 (2010).
47 Setsuo Miyazawa, “Introduction:  An Unbalanced Adversary System – Issues, Policies and Practicesin 
Japan, in Context and in Comparative Perspective,” in MALCOLM M. FEELEY AND SETSUO MIYAZAWA (EDS.), 
THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CONTEXT (PALGRAVE-MACMILLAN, 2002), p. 2.  
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 The detention period for the Tachikawa suspects was scheduled to expire on March 19. 
The foremost goal of their attorneys was to convince the prosecutors to drop their charges 
by that date. The attorneys were able to persuade Judge Hasegawa to hold a court hearing to 
review the prosecutors’ grounds for continued detention of their clients. This hearing was 
conducted in open court on March 11. Friends and supporters of the three suspects were able 
to see them for the first time since the arrests.48 
 When March 19 arrived, prosecutors indicted all three activists on trespass charges.  Any 
hope that the charges would be dropped and the suspects could put all this behind them was 
gone.  Although the indictment was a terrible blow, it was not unexpected.  The fact that the ar-
rests occurred fully five weeks after the flyer incident suggests that the government was com-
mitted to prosecution from the beginning. 
 Trespass is a serious crime punishable by up to three years imprisonment.  Japan’s pro-
secutors do not engage in American-style “plea bargaining” where defendants exchange con-
fessions for favorable sentences.  Once the indictment is filed every case is expected to go to 
trial.  
 Now the suspects became defendants.  As defendants, they enjoyed a right to release on 
bail.  The defense lawyers immediately requested that the Tachikawa defendants be released, 
but this was opposed by the government.  Then it was denied by the court.  
 This result was also expected.  From the viewpoint of the government and the court, by 
maintaining their silence and refusing to cooperate with interrogators, the three suspects had 
shown they are especially recalcitrant.  In the reverse logic of Japan’s criminal justice system, 
suspects who choose to exercise the constitutional right to remain silent in this way are es-
pecially suspicious.  As summarized by Professor David T. Johnson, “Suspects who insist on 
their innocence stand only a tiny chance of being released.  Simply put, suspects who do not 
confess do not get bail.”49
 As their reason for opposing the release, the prosecutors cited the same statutory grounds 
they do in countless other cases:  if the defendants were released, they might flee or “destroy 
evidence.”  The police had confiscated the files and computers of Tent Village and the defen-
dants during the raid on February 27.  One can only wonder what evidence remained to be de-
stroyed.  
 The day after the indictment was the first anniversary of the invasion of Iraq.  Demonstra-
tions were held around the world to protest the war.  Japan experienced some of the largest 
demonstrations against the Iraq deployment so far.  The anti-war coalition “World Peace Now” 
estimated that 130,000 people demonstrated around Japan, with 30,000 gathering at Tokyo’s 
Hibiya Park.
 With rejection of their bail request, the defendants and their lawyers were forced to pre-
pare for trial while the defendants remained in jail.  Japan’s trials take place through a series 
of separate court hearings typically spaced several weeks apart.  The first court hearing in the 
Tachikawa case was scheduled for May 6.
48 MITSURU MUNAKATA, MACHI KARA HANSEN NO KOE GA KIERU TOKI (“WHEN ANTI-WAR VOICES DISAPPEAR FROM 
THE STREETS”) (KISHINSHA, 2005), pp. 110-11.
49 DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2002) p. 62.
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Akio Horikoshi and the Japan Communist Party 
 The Japan Communist Party (JCP) was founded in the 1920s, but members were soon 
rounded up under harsh laws that prohibited ideologies that might conflict with the paramount 
duty of all subjects to worship Japan’s divine emperor.  The handful of Party leaders still alive 
at war’s end were released from prison in October 1945 by order of General MacArthur.  With 
the rise of Cold War tensions, however, the JCP once again became a target of police surveil-
lance and suppression.  The immediate postwar era was a time of great poverty and social tur-
moil.  Fears of a communist rise to power were real.  Occupation authorities and Japan’s rul-
ing establishment responded by reviving many of the secret police practices that had prevailed 
before 1945.
 Despite the inspirational promises of freedom of thought and conscience in Article 18 of 
the 1947 Constitution and freedom of association and speech in Article 21, this surveillance 
continues.  In fact, the police even publish brief reports based on their JCP investigations in 
an annual “White Paper” that cover Party membership and activities, distribution of the daily 
newspaper (Akahata or “Red Flag”) and other details.  (The White Paper also provides brief 
reports on the peace movement, the anti-nuclear power movement and activities by large citi-
zen groups.)
 As they followed Akio Horikoshi on his rounds with their video cameras, the undercover 
police were well aware that he was doing volunteer work for the JCP.  The items he anony-
mously dropped into residents’ mailboxes included the Akahata and the newsletter of a local 
JCP politician who had been elected to the municipal assembly.  
 Horikoshi’s arrest provided a splendid opportunity for the police to update their files on 
local JCP membership, electoral tactics and other issues.  On the day of the arrest a task force 
of 60 police officers descended on the Chiyoda-ku JCP office and appeared at the suspect’s 
home and other locations.  The dragnet search produced a large volume of intelligence.
 No matter that the Soviet Union had collapsed back in 1991 or that the JCP agenda calls 
primarily for things like better pensions, reduced health care costs and improvement on other 
bread-and-butter issues.50  JCP leaders are also among the most vigorous defenders of Article 
9 and the individual freedoms guaranteed by the 1947 Constitution.  From the viewpoint of Ja-
pan’s political establishment, these people must be watched carefully.
 The first hearing in the trial of Akio Horikoshi was held at the main Tokyo courthouse in 
Kasumigaseki on July 20.  It began in orthodox fashion, but would produce a result so unex-
pected that some lawyers called it historic.
 We have seen that prosecutors enjoy impressive procedural advantages in their pursuit 
of guilty verdicts.  The most fundamental is the power to detain suspects for lengthy periods 
before filing charges and to ban defense lawyers from interrogation rooms.  Another major ad-
vantage is the power to conceal evidence from the defense.  Unlike the United States and other 
jurisdictions, there is no Japanese rule that compels prosecutors to disclose all evidence, in-
50 JCP policies are described on the Party website, http://www.jcp.or.jp. (accessed Feb. 8, 2016).
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cluding exculpatory items, to the defense.  As a result, defense lawyers have often been blind-
sided by the sudden presentation of evidence they knew nothing about.  Even worse, there 
have been cases where exculpatory evidence was hidden for years and even decades.51 
 As the Tachikawa and Horikoshi cases were unfolding, major changes were underway in 
the judicial system, including the creation of a new law school system and the introduction of 
“lay judges” to sit alongside professional judges in the trial of serious criminal cases.  In addi-
tion, there were several revisions to the code of criminal procedure intended to address com-
plaints that criminal trials took too long and were hard for ordinary people to understand.  Per-
haps the most important change was the introduction of a new pre-trial procedure that requires 
the prosecution and the defense to identify all issues and their proposed evidence at an early 
stage of the proceedings.  The new procedure certainly carried the potential to speed up trials 
and reduce the likelihood of major surprises.
 By 2004, the new procedures were under careful study by legal professionals in Japan. 
As attorneys and prosecutors squared off in Tokyo District Court on July 20, 2004, they were 
well aware of the new code provisions, but they were also aware that those provisions would 
not take effect for another year.  So as they argued over evidence to be introduced at trial, they 
were taken by surprise when Judge Yūjirō Nakatani intervened to say, “Shall we proceed in 
the spirit of the new code of criminal procedure?”52
 Article 316-26 of the new Code provides the judge with unambiguous authority to order 
the disclosure of government evidence in response to defense requests.  Aroused by the spirit 
of the new Code – and the aggressive demands of the defense – Judge Nakatani ordered the 
prosecutors to disclose 29 pieces of evidence.  Prosecutors objected, but they did not appeal 
the order.53
 Japan’s defense bar would hail the Nakatani order as a historic achievement.  Of the 29 
items, 11 pertained to the decision to investigate Akio Horikoshi.  These items would prove in-
valuable to the defense attorneys when it came time to question police officers on the witness 
stand.  But the biggest surprise came with disclosure of the details of the intensive surveillance 
of their client.  Prior to the disclosures made pursuant to the Nakatani order, neither the de-
fense lawyers nor anyone else aside from the police themselves knew of the intensive surveil-
lance of Akio Horikoshi.  Defense counsel were shocked to learn of the plainclothes surveil-
51 For a discussion of the prosecutors’ power to withhold evidence, see Johnson, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUS-
TICE, at 74-75.  The grant of a re-trial to Iwao Hakamada recently shined a spotlight on the problem of 
concealed evidence.  See David McNeill, “Travesty of justice: legal reform unlikely despite erroneous 
convictions,” The Japan Times, Jan. 16, 2016. 
52 Naoto Sasayama, 歴史的大事件 ― 国公法弾圧堀越事件, 第一回公判の報告, available at http://www.
jlaf.jp/tsushin/2004/1139.html (accessed Feb. 7, 2016).  In the words of the Asahi, the Judge’s action in 
enforcing rules that were yet to take effect was “extremely unusual.” (kiwamete irei da)  Asahi Shimbun, 
July 21, 2004.
53 One of the lead attorneys in the case would later explain that even under the new Code, the prosecutors 
still enjoy broad discretion.  To take advantage of the new rules, attorneys must be able to identify evi-
dence they wish to see.  Of course, if they don’t know it exists, they can’t identify it.  According to at-
torney Kenji Kato, when the police filed their request for an arrest warrant for Mr. Horikoshi, they ap-
pended a list of 33 videos recorded during the investigation.  Of the 33, only 9 were ordered disclosed by 
Judge Nakatani.  Kenji Kato, 堀越事件の経過と刑事裁判の問題点, Hō to Minshushugi, May 2006, No. 
408, pp. 25-28. Mainichi Shimbun, June 3, 2004.
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lance teams, the video cameras and other aspects of the surveillance.  But when the shock wore 
off, they saw there was a powerful new argument to be made.  The lawyers were provided a 
nearly irrefutable claim that the entire police investigation was unlawful and therefore the case 
should be thrown out.  According to defense counsel Kenji Kato, the police had no reasonable 
cause to launch a criminal investigation of this ordinary citizen.  There is no way the police or 
anyone else could know either that Horikoshi was employed by a government agency or that 
he delivered political material on his days off unless they were monitoring the JCP offices and 
then tailing visitors like Horikoshi.54  
 Like the Tachikawa case, there was no dispute over the essential facts.  The critical work 
of defense counsel in both cases was to shift the court’s focus beyond these facts toward ques-
tions of law.  In Tachikawa, defense lawyers relied on the constitutional right to free speech. 
In the Horikoshi case, defense counsel had a rather more powerful and disturbing claim – the 
entire police investigation was in violation of the law.  If Japan’s law protects a right to pri-
vacy, it is hard to imagine a more egregious violation of this right than the police surveillance 
of Akio Horikoshi.
Tachikawa – the First Court Hearing
 The first hearing in the trial of the Tent Village members commenced at 3 P.M. on Thurs-
day, May 6.  The site was a branch of Tokyo District Court located in the suburban town of 
Hachioji, about forty kilometers from the Tokyo city center, at the edge of the mountainous 
spine of the country.  Although Hachioji is far from the center of the metropolis, it is conve-
nient to Tachikawa and other small cities to the west. 
 The trial would be heard there by a panel of three judges led by Chief Judge Ken’ichi 
Hasegawa.  Expecting a large turnout for the hearing, Judge Hasegawa reserved the largest 
room in the courthouse.  He started proceedings by asking the three defendants to identify 
themselves.  When they were finished, it was time for the government to present the charges.
 Under the system that prevailed until 2006, anyone who completed at least two years of 
college qualified to sit for the national law examination.  In some years, more than 40,000 ap-
plicants did so, even though they knew government officials would allow only the top 1,000 or 
so to pass and thereby gain the right to become a prosecutor, judge or attorney.  That’s a very 
discouraging pass rate.  Applicants studied hard and some did so for many years before pass-
ing or giving up.  
 It seems unlikely that dreams of prosecuting anti-war activists with the pluck to slip their 
flyers through anonymous mail slots inspired Prosecutor Hisae Yamaguchi during the long 
hours of study that led to this assignment.  But there he was.  On May 6, 2004, it fell to him to 
stand before the court and read out the indictment.
 Yamaguchi told the court that after the initial flyer deliveries, custodians at the Tachikawa 
apartments posted notices to warn trespassers at no fewer than 31 locations around the proper-
ty.  He said that when the three activists appeared at the property on January 17, some of their 
54 Kato, Id.
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movements were recorded by digital cameras and they were confronted by several residents. 
In fact, in response to the demand of an SDF member, one activist had actually retrieved some 
of the flyers he had already delivered.55
 Summarizing the government’s view of the applicable law, Yamaguchi told the court that 
the defendants had conspired to enter the Tachikawa SDF residential complex with the inten-
tion of distributing anti-war flyers.  On January 17 they had trespassed into residences without 
justifiable grounds (seitō na riyū), proceeding from the building entrances, climbing stairs and 
passing through corridors to pass by the doors of individual apartments, where they slipped 
their flyers through mail and newspaper slots.  In the government’s view, these acts fulfilled 
all elements of the crime of trespass as defined by Article 130 of Japan’s Criminal Code.56 
 When the prosecutor was done, each of the three defendants also rose to address the 
court.  They had maintained silence throughout the long interrogation sessions.  Standing now 
before a judicial panel rather than government interrogators intent on breaking their will, each 
one admitted the essential facts.  Yes, they did indeed enter the property on January 17 and de-
livered the Tent Village flyers.  They also described their intentions for doing so.  In the words 
of one, 
　　As one citizen who lives in the same society as the Self-Defense Force mem-
bers, I think it is necessary for them to understand the realities of war and the po-
litical intentions of the governments of the United States and Japan.  It is the SDF 
members who will risk their lives by going to the battlefields.  We citizens bear a 
duty to make sure they know not only the biased claims of the government, but also 
the voices of the many citizens who think differently.   
 He went on to describe Constitution Article 9 as a response to Japan’s wars of aggression. 
As for the actions of Tent Village and other citizen groups, he said, “the existence of citizens 
who actively speak out is a realization of the ideals of the Constitution.”57 
 When the three were finished, one of the supporters broke into applause.  After this el-
derly spectator was gently threatened with expulsion by Judge Hasegawa for this outburst, she 
promised to restrain herself and the judge relented.  
 In every criminal prosecution, the government carries the burden to prove all elements 
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  The Asahi described the central issue of the case this 
way: “To prove the crime of trespassing, it is necessary to show that ‘there were no justifiable 
grounds’ (for entering the property).  By arguing the propriety (seitōsei) of the flyer distribu-
tion, the prosecution and the defense confronted each other directly” on this key issue.58
 Chief counsel Reiko Kuriyama explained the “justifiable grounds” for her clients’ actions. 
“[I]n modern society, the means of communication like television and newspapers are monop-
olized by giant corporations.  The act of handing out flyers should be respected to the greatest 
55 Mainichi Shimbun, June 3, 2004.
56 Munakata, supra n. 48, p. 167.
57 Id., pp. 168-9.
58 Asahi Shimbun, May 7, 2004.
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possible extent as one of the few means available to citizens to communicate to their fellows 
their thoughts and beliefs and the fruit of their experience and wisdom.”  “By suppressing 
these actions of the defendants,” she continued, “the opportunity to expose Self-Defense Force 
members to opposing views was taken away.”59
 As noted in the Asahi editorial of March 5 and elsewhere, a related issue was the differen-
tial treatment applied to different categories of trespassers.  The deliverymen who handed out 
real estate and pizza flyers enjoyed no more license to enter the Tachikawa property than the 
Tent Village members, but they did not meet the same fate.  
 Seeking insight into this problem, the Mainichi interviewed a 28-year old worker at a lo-
cal pizza shop.  “It is sometimes said that distributing flyers at residential buildings is ‘illegal 
trespassing,’ but there are never any complaints.  And we don’t deliver flyers to families that 
refuse them.”  Regarding the Tachikawa SDF property itself, he said his shop made more than 
ten sales per month.  On the issue of greatest importance to a practical businessman, he un-
knowingly paraphrased Attorney Kuriyama: “If distributing flyers is illegal, we have no way to 
advertise.”60
 The Mainichi was also able to obtain rare public comments from a senior official with 
authority in the case.  The reporter homed in on the differential treatment for pizza flyers and 
peace flyers.  After stating that he could not speak in detail on an ongoing investigation, Eiichi 
Aizawa, Deputy Chief of the Hachioji District Prosecutors Office said, “for example, if we 
consider the pizza flyers, the residents may be delighted to receive them.  However, in cases 
where they are annoying the residents, even if the method of delivery is the same, the meaning 
is different.”
 The reporter elicited the thoughts of Prosecutor Aizawa on the “chilling effect” of the 
Tachikawa arrests.  Aizawa explained that decisions to arrest and prosecute were made on a 
case-by-case basis, so the fact that prosecutors had acted in the Tachikawa case did not neces-
sarily mean that they would act elsewhere.  However, he did acknowledge that the Tachikawa 
arrests might serve as a warning to others – “we also have the aim of preventing crimes by 
suppressing the (illegal) activities of other organizations.”61 
 In fact, members of other citizen groups were saying that the Tachikawa prosecutions had 
precisely that effect on their own work.  For example, Mihagi Yamamoto, an office worker 
with a group called “Peace Action,” told the Mainichi that her group had refrained from par-
ticipating in large demonstrations near military installations since the Tachikawa arrests.  “Over 
the past year, I don’t think our activities or the feelings of the citizens have changed,” she said. 
“We are just taking precautions because we don’t know what the police will do.”62
 During the weeks leading up to the first trial session, supporters had been working hard at 
train stations and other public sites explaining the plight of their friends to passersby and seek-
59 Munakata, supra n. 48, p. 169.　Kuriyama registered as an attorney in 1979.  Her office is located in the 
Tachikawa city center, walking distance from the main Tachikawa train station.  http://nt-law.info/ (ac-
cessed Feb. 7, 2016.)
60 Mainichi Shimbun, June 3, 2004.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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ing support.  By May 6 they had gathered more than 4,000 signatures to a petition demanding 
their friends’ freedom.  This petition was submitted to the court as an appendix to the defen-
dants’ formal bail request. 
 Judge Hasegawa acted the following day, ordering the release of the defendants pending 
the outcome of the trial.  The prosecution immediately appealed, but Tokyo High Court (the 
appellate court) acted quickly.  The defendants remained in custody over the weekend, but on 
Monday morning the High Court upheld Judge Hasegawa’s order and the defendants were re-
leased.  They enjoyed their first taste of freedom in 75 days.
Sapporo – August
 Sixty attorneys gathered in Sapporo on August 11 and 12 to compare notes on strategy in 
their litigation challenging the constitutionality of the Iraq deployment.  By August 2004, suits 
seeking judgments that the Iraq deployment was unconstitutional had been filed at six court-
houses around Japan and attorneys were preparing to file at several others.
 The attorneys were driven by their intense belief in the Constitution and the importance 
of preserving Article 9 and their belief that the Prime Minister’s action was a grave mistake. 
They were eager to engage the courts and the public in an impassioned debate over the mean-
ing and significance of the pacifist clause in the Constitution and how it affected Japan’s 
standing in the world.
 But they all knew that the most daunting hurdle was presented not by grand strategic 
questions like this, but instead by a quite mundane question:  Would any of the courts find that 
the plaintiffs had a sufficiently direct legal interest to support a lawsuit?  In the American ter-
minology, would any of the courts recognize their clients’ “standing”?
 The attorneys knew that Japan’s strict standing rules were likely to disqualify all or nearly 
all of their clients.  The strict standing doctrine dates from the 1982 Supreme Court judgment 
in the Naganuma Nike Missile case.  That case grew out of a conflict between the national 
government and residents of a farming community in Hokkaido in the 1960s.  When the Min-
istry of Agriculture and Forestry announced that it would cancel its designation of a protected 
forest area, 173 residents of a nearby community joined to file suit in Sapporo District Court 
seeking a court order to block it.  The Ministry’s intention was to make that land available for 
construction of a Self-Defense Force missile base.  By preserving the forest designation, the 
plaintiffs sought not only to protect the forest, but also to block construction of the base. 
 The plaintiffs argued that they would be injured by the government plan, both directly 
through an increased risk of flooding and indirectly, because their neighborhood would be 
transformed into a high-value target in the event of armed conflict.  Moreover, they argued that 
the decision to convert the forestry reserve had been made for an improper purpose.  Because 
Article 9 prohibits the maintenance of “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war poten-
tial,” they claimed the existence of the SDF was unconstitutional63 and therefore construction 
of an SDF base was an unconstitutional act.
63 In 1969, many legal scholars and ordinary citizens shared this opinion. 
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 In a momentous decision that made the front page of every Japanese newspaper, Judge 
Shigeo Fukushima agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a temporary order blocking construc-
tion on August 22, 1969.64  Like the “Date Judgment” in the Sunakawa case ten years earlier, 
a district court judge had once again taken Article 9 at face value and interpreted it to rule Ja-
pan’s defense policy unconstitutional.  
 As in its Sunakawa judgment, however, the Supreme Court found a way to rule in the 
government’s favor while avoiding the substantive constitutional question.  But instead or 
relying on its “political question” doctrine as it had in the Sunakawa case, this time the Court 
ruled that the plaintiffs had no direct legal interest of sufficient weight to support a right to 
bring suit.  In other words, they lacked standing.
 After Judge Fukushima’s decision, government engineers built dikes and took other ac-
tion intended eliminate the risk of flooding.  The Court ruled that this action eliminated the 
“direct” injury claimed by the plaintiffs.  That left the claim of indirect injury.  The plaintiffs 
argued that construction of a military base nearby would place their homes within proximity of 
an important military target.  In the event of an attack, they and their families would be placed 
at risk.  The Supreme Court ruled that this was not a sufficiently direct interest to support the 
suit and the case was dismissed.65
 The 1982 judgment in the Naganuma case has been interpreted to impose a very strict 
standing requirement in Japan.  As the sixty lawyers discussed the issue in Sapporo in August 
2004, it is unlikely that any of them had confidence they had found a plaintiff with a claim that 
would survive a standing challenge.  It seemed unlikely that any Japanese court would decide 
that an activist writer or ordinary citizen could show a sufficiently “direct” interest to with-
stand a standing challenge.  The ideal client would be an SDF member who was punished for 
refusing orders to deploy to Iraq.  But no such client would be found.
 Hajime Kawaguchi of Nagoya and many others saw the claim to a right to live in peace 
as the most likely source of a “direct interest” sufficient to justify a court in maintaining their 
action.  A cadre of constitutional scholars including Kenji Urata, Takeshi Kobayashi, and many 
others had labored for years in building a theoretical structure to support this right.66
 There was no doubt that participation in the American invasion of Iraq would have pro-
found impacts on the security of Japan and of every Japanese citizen.  And the language of the 
Constitution was unyielding.  Proponents of the right to live in peace relied not only on Article 
9, but also on key language in the Preamble.
 A constitutional “right to live in peace” is enjoyed by all the people.  Any action taken 
by the government that threatened this right – such as dispatching forces to support military 
activities in a battle that had nothing to do with Japan’s defense – could support a claim by 
64 The temporary order was made permanent by entry of the final judgment of Sapporo District Court on 
Sept. 7, 1973.  That judgment was appealed and all issues were ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court.
65 See discussion of the Naganuma decisions in Craig Martin, “Binding the Dogs of War: Japan and the 
Constitutionalizing of Jus ad Bellum” 30 U. PA. J. INT’L. L. 267, 337-38 (2008). Martin notes that the 
missile base was actually constructed during the interim because the District Court order was stayed 
pending appeal.
66 Hudson P. Hamilton, “A New Human Right in Japan: The Nagoya High Court and Okayama District 
Court Recognize the Right to Live in Peace,” 19 PAC. RIM LAW & POL. J. 1 (2010).
52　　MEIJI LAW JOURNAL / 23
any resident of Japan.  If the attorneys could persuade a court to recognize this right, then the 
standing issue would disappear.  
 Of course, all of the attorneys remained on the lookout for a client, like a pacifist SDF 
member, who might satisfy the standing rule with a more conventional direct interest. 
Hachioji Courthouse
 The trial of the three Tachikawa defendants took place over the course of seven separate 
hearings spread from May through November.  The defendants admitted delivering the Tent 
Village flyers at the first hearing, so the prosecutors were spared the effort of proving they did 
so.  With these admissions in hand, they could move to the task of explaining how the defen-
dants’ acts fulfilled all elements of Article 130 of the Criminal Code.
 Among these elements was the requirement that the defendants had no “justifiable 
grounds” to enter the apartment buildings.  To prove this, the prosecutors called three building 
residents to the witness stand to describe their experience.  They testified that although the de-
fendants’ acts might appear to be harmless, they had in fact caused great annoyance and stress 
to them and their families.  Messages attacking the Iraq deployment forced them to think about 
their own role in the government’s plans.
 In addition to any fear that that they might be deployed to the war zone themselves, they 
were part of a very unpopular policy.  A strong majority of the public remained opposed to the 
Iraq deployment.  According to a public opinion poll published by the Mainichi two days be-
fore the verdict, 62% percent of respondents opposed continuation of SDF operations in Iraq. 
This compared with 54% who had opposed the Iraq deployment one year earlier. 
 By early November, both sides had completed their evidentiary presentations and final 
arguments.  In their summation, the prosecutors demanded prison terms of six months for each 
of the three defendants.  The case was left in the hands of the three-judge panel led by Chief 
Judge Hasegawa.
 The judges issued their decision in the large room in Hachioji courthouse on Thursday, 
December 16.  Supporters and other interested citizens filled the approximately eighty seats in 
the courtroom and another seventy waited outside.67
 Judge Hasegawa read key portions of the judgment aloud for about an hour.  Japan’s court 
opinions ordinarily begin with a brief statement of the verdict (shubun) followed by a summa-
ry of facts, an explanation of the grounds for the decision, and a conclusion.  In most cases, the 
presiding judge reads the verdict at the outset.  In some extraordinary cases, however, judges 
choose to present the analysis first and save the result for the end.  Inevitably, courtroom ten-
sion builds as the judge gradually reveals the direction of his analysis, with listeners locked in, 
searching for hints to the outcome.  According to the Tokyo Shimbun, Japan’s judges follow 
this practice only in very important cases such as those involving a death penalty.
 Judge Hasegawa had no doubt about the importance of this one.  He made his audience sit 
patiently for an hour as he worked through his analysis.  When he reached the verdict, it was a 
67 Tokyo Shimbun, Dec. 17, 2004.
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single sentence:  “Each of the defendants is not guilty.”  
 The courtroom erupted in cries of joy.68 
 The court’s decision was frontpage news the next day.  After a brief introduction, the 
Asahi began to explain the court’s judgment with this quote from the text: “[T]he degree of 
violation of the residents’ privacy was low.  When we consider that, as one form of political 
expression protected by the Constitution, distributing flyers is a pillar of democratic society, 
the level of illegality is not sufficient for a criminal penalty.”69
 “Level of illegality?”  This would be a headscratcher for lay readers and scholars alike. 
The court appeared to say that the acts of the defendants were illegal, but not illegal enough. 
Defense lawyers had fought for a judgment that their clients had not committed trespass at all. 
The court apparently said they did.
 Although the actions of the defendants technically fulfilled the requirements of Article 
130, according to the court, it was nonetheless wrong to find them guilty:  “...even regard-
ing acts that fulfill the required constituent elements, in consideration of the propriety of the 
motivations that led to the act, the sufficiency of behavior (kōi taiyōsei no sōtōsei) and other 
circumstances including the extent of resulting injury, from the viewpoint of the legal order in 
its entirety, there are cases where the extent of the illegality is not sufficient to apply a criminal 
penalty, and therefore does not amount to a crime.”70 
 After stating this confusing principle, the court entered into an analysis of the defendants’ 
motivations and behavior, and the results of their actions.  The court emphasized that the de-
fendants had maintained the highest standards of behavior during their presence in the build-
ings.  They spoke with no one and did not ring doorbells or otherwise seek to directly draw the 
attention of the residents; they simply placed a single page flyer into the mail slots of individu-
al apartments.  Reviewing the content of the flyers, the court found that the manner of expres-
sion was restrained and the content was not significantly different from what building residents 
would see when they read the morning newspaper.  The court found that although the flyers 
contained statements of opposition to government policy, they did not carry either criticism of 
the SDF members themselves or threats of violence to anyone.  Further, the court found that 
any injury to the rights of the residents was trivial, beneath the threshold of injury necessary 
to support prosecution.  Anyone who didn’t like the flyers could easily dispose of them along 
with other junk mail.
 Although the court’s reasoning may have been confusing, the result was not.  The defen-
dants were not guilty.  
 There was celebration in Tachikawa that night attended by a crowd of 150.  It was time to 
congratulate the three heroes and laud their attorneys for their great efforts.  The acquittal was 
68 Id.
69 Asahi Shimbun, Dec. 17, 2004.
70 Tokyo District Court, Hachioji Branch, Decision of Dec. 16, 2004 (Chief Judge Ken’ichi Hasegawa) (un-
reported).
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especially important to the oldest of the three defendants.  Employed as a middle school cook, 
he was a government employee.  If found guilty, he would have been terminated.  
  Jubilation was not limited to the courtroom supporters.  Peace activists and free speech 
advocates all over Japan shared the joy.  Major newspapers carried comments from consti-
tutional scholars supporting the decision and touting the court’s veneration of the right to 
free speech.  The Mainichi quoted one who called the judgment epochal and complimented 
the court on ignoring the background noise to clearly understand that “this case is about the 
effort to shut down political discourse.”  Another pointed out that the judgment would be 
especially important to civil society organizations.  To get the viewpoint of such organiza-
tions, the Mainichi interviewed Makoto Teranaka, a long-serving representative of Amnesty 
International in Japan.  Amnesty had issued a press release on March 18, the day before the 
indictment, calling for the immediate release of the three suspects and formally identifying 
them as “prisoners of conscience,” who were imprisoned for their beliefs.  This term is usually 
reserved for victims of repression by the world’s most authoritarian regimes.  It was the first 
time Amnesty had applied the term in Japan.  Teranaka said the acquittal came as no surprise: 
“It was the attempt to punish the defendants because of the contents of the flyers that is wrong. 
The prosecutors should not abuse their power.  They should sincerely accept the judgment of 
the court.”71   
 The Asahi quoted Nagoya University Professor Kōji Aikyō to say, “As you read the 
court’s opinion it becomes apparent that around the time of the deployment, the police and 
the SDF collaborated to target ‘anti-deployment’ flyers.  The fact that the Iraq deployment 
necessitated this kind of repression should be long remembered.”72  Professor Yūji Shiratori, a 
criminal procedure expert at Hokkaido University did not pull any punches.  “The prosecutors 
should hang their heads for bringing this ‘trespass’ case to trial.  Something very great was 
lost in the process of the investigation.  This kind of investigation and prosecution must not be 
repeated.”73
 Of course, there was another side to the debate.  The Mainichi quoted a retired prosecu-
tor named Takeshi Dōmoto to say the acquittal was a mistake.  The court’s opinion included 
criticism of the failure of the police to contact Tent Village before making the arrests.  Dōmoto 
bluntly declared that “Article 130 of the Criminal Code does not call for such prior notice.  I 
could understand if the court had just reduced the sentence.  By acquitting the defendants, the 
court went too far.”74  Dōmoto was identified as a professor of criminal procedure law at a pri-
vate university, one of many who joined the new law schools that began operations in 2004. 
During his career as a prosecutor, he had reached the ladder’s highest rung as a government 
advocate in cases before Japan’s Supreme Court. 
 December 16 was a night for celebration.  But the defense attorneys knew the job was 
not done.  Under Japan’s law of criminal procedure, prosecutors can appeal the rare acquittals 
71 Mainichi Shimbun, Dec. 17, 2004.
72 Asahi Shimbun, Dec. 17, 2004.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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issued by Japan’s courts.  And they usually do.  The attorneys formally requested the Tokyo 
District Prosecutors Office to let the verdict stand.  But this was a letter written in vain.
 The government filed its appeal on December 24.  The ordeal of the “prisoners of con-
science” would continue. 
Afterword
 The police campaign against antiwar protesters was not limited to the cases described 
above.  It appears that a decision was made at a senior level to suppress public opposition to 
Japan’s participation in the Iraq War through aggressive enforcement of laws concerning trivi-
al matters, perhaps similar to the “broken windows” initiative against street crime employed in 
the United States.
 Examples included prosecutions for anti-war graffiti,75 false statements to government 
officials in cases where arrestees had failed to update addresses on their driver’s licenses, and 
others.76
 Public demonstrations against the Iraq War itself were quite small when compared to 
the mass rallies that arose in western democracies.  One of the most notable took place in the 
Shibuya district of Tokyo on July 4, 2004.  According to the Japan Federation of Bar Associa-
tions and other sources, about 1,200 marchers gathered by a group called “World Peace Now” 
were surrounded by approximately 2,000 police.  The police aggressively restricted the march-
ers’ movement and taunted them with threats of arrest.  Physical contact led to some scuffles. 
Three marchers were beaten and arrested for “interference with execution of official duties” 
(gyōmu shikkō bōgai).  They were released without charges after eleven days in detention.77
 The December 2004 acquittal of the Tachikawa defendants was reversed by the Tokyo 
High Court on December 9, 2005.  The High Court’s guilty verdict was upheld by a panel of 
the Supreme Court in a final judgment issued on April 11, 2008 and the defendants were pe-
nalized with small fines.78 
75 See “Man found guilty of drawing antiwar graffiti in restroom,” Japan Times, Feb. 13, 2004.
76 See Uchida, n. 19, pp. 24-44.
77 JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, IMA HYŌGEN NO JIYŪ TO SHIRU KENRI WO KANGAERU, (Nov. 5, 2009), p. 67.
78 Decision of the Supreme Court, 2nd P. Bench, April 11, 2008, Keishū vol. 62, no. 5, p. 1217.
